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Grand Central Political Magazine
Afghanistan: Changing The Way Canada Does Business
By Hon. Denis Coderre, PC, MP
In a democracy, government is supposed to decide defence and foreign policies and military leaders are supposed to carry out the missions given to them. In Canada, however, the tail may be wagging the dog.
The government has adopted a Bush-like philosophy that places military operations above foreign policies and badly skewers what should be a balanced "Triple-D" approach to defense, development and diplomacy.
This is creating a major shift in Canada's international role by tying us to a more war-like military future. The face of our armed forces, our defence policy and foreign relations are being dramatically changed without any real debate or oversight.
The most obvious result is the ease with which huge sums have been dedicated to buying new equipment without any competition. Virtually all the "fast-tracked" military purchases have been declared vital to our Afghan mission. Yet only a small portion of the almost $20 billion now earmarked will produce equipment during the current mission.
The latest purchase involves 100 mothballed Leopard II tanks from Holland over a five-year period, plus the leasing of 20 of the latest Leopard tank models from Germany.
A year ago Canada was scrapping its old Leopards and CDS General Hillier considered tanks of any kind to be obsolete. Now they are considered vital for Afghanistan. Yet our mission there is supposed to be over in two years, so why are we embarking on a five-year plan to spend $1.3 billion to buy and maintain tanks? Because, says former Defense Minister Gordon O'Connor, we will need them in Afghanistan or similar operations for the next 15 years. Does he know something we do not?
To pay for tanks for a generation of fighting, National Defence scrapped a $700-million deal with General Dynamics Land Systems Canada to buy 66 wheeled, cannon-equipped, light-armoured vehicles, a variation of the LAV III light armoured vehicle now used in Afghanistan and popular with past missions.
This is only the latest example of how Afghanistan is being used as a "state-of-emergency" excuse to rush through questionable purchases. The same excuse was used last summer when three big airlift deals worth a total $13 billion were announced. The need was so urgent that competitions couldn't be held. There was no time to look at other options. We had to rush to sole-source contracts with privately pre-selected US suppliers.
Yet, for the most part, the airlift equipment will not be ready for use in Afghanistan - at least not before the current mandate is supposed to end in 2009. True, we received the first of four Boeing C-17 strategic airlifters last fall, but we were already meeting needs for large transporters though leasing at a fraction of the cost of the $3.4 billion of the C-17s. We will also have to continue leasing for some time to come for the oversize airlifts.
Meanwhile, the first Boeing Chinook helicopters and Lockheed Martin C-130J tactical airlifters are not slated to arrive before 2010 - 2011 (if we are lucky) - more than a year after Canada's Afghanistan mission is supposed to conclude - and the last ones will not arrive until two years after that.
So why rush to sole-source this equipment now? There is time to allow competition and look at options for the military, the taxpayer and Canada's domestic industries.
We could see if there are better deals. Perhaps we could direct some funds to equipment needed for domestic security and for other overseas operations that are not tied to Afghanistan. The list is long, yet we have no comprehensive plan for meeting all our military needs and the options are becoming increasingly limited.
For example, the early expenditure of $1.9 billion to purchase the C-17s on a rush basis (plus $1.5 billion in ongoing service costs) has eliminated a huge sum from the kitty that could have gone towards our planned new Fixed-Wing search and rescue aircraft.
We believe we should provide good equipment for our troops, but we also believe in due diligence. We need to bring checks and balances to National Defence by reorganizing the department to create more transparency to the procurement process and ensure accountability for the decisions that are made. We need an independent expert agency that can give us confidence that any acquisition is based on true merits and not perceived as the result of individuals picking their personal favourites.
Procurements have to pass the "smell test." We cannot continue to select equipment by "drawing a line in the sand" - to quote a phrase used by CDS General Hillier. We need to know that what we are buying is the result of a genuinely competitive process that best meets long-term needs at the best cost.
The best way to achieve this would be to appoint a defense department Inspector General with full powers to examine the actions of the government, the defense department and the contracts. This IG would audit operations to ensure they are in compliance with general established government policies. The office would have a mandate to seek out waste and investigate possible misconduct or misuse of funds. Furthermore, this new IG should have power to reopen contracts and lay charges if necessary.
Sir Winston Churchill once said: "Politics is the ability to foretell what is going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month and next year; and to have the ability afterwards to explain why it didn't happen." It's a definition that fits what is happening with our defence and foreign policies. Churchill will be proved right once again - unless this minority government changes its ways now.
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Denis Coderre is a former Canadian cabinet minister, a veteran Liberal Party Member of Parliament, and currently his party's National Defence critic.